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Occupational health and safety management systems - An 
institutional analysis. 
 
Abstract 
 
The analysis in this paper concerns how national institutions impact the implementation of occupational healthy 
and safety management systems (OHSMS) in different types of market economies. The main objective is to show 
how variation in national institutional frameworks influences the implementation of OHSMS, and thus, relative 
performance. There are two main conclusions. First, dominating organisational templates and co-operative 
industrial relations structures allow firms from coordinated market economies (CME) to more effectively 
implement OHSMS than those from liberal market economies (LME) which are embedded in adversarial industrial 
relations. Secondly, due to differences in the institutional framework among countries, the mechanisms of 
enforcement for OHSMS need to be designed in different ways. The article contributes to the literature by showing 
that the implementation and functioning of OHSMS are mediated by the different institutional logics in which 
firms are embedded.   
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1 - Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, certified management systems (CMS) have gained 
importance and have been used by firms all over the world in different organisational 
fields. There has been a diffusion of self-regulatory regimes in the United States, Europe, 
and other advanced economies (Gunnigham and Rees, 1997; Teubner, Farmer, and 
Murphy 1994), creating  an emerging  world of certifications and standards  (Brunnson 
and Jacobsoon, 2000; Rees, 1997). CMS are an attempt to codify practices that are 
socially desirable and economically viable in areas as diverse as quality, working 
environment, environmental management, labour management, and e-commerce 
security. Examples of CMS include the ISO 9000 (quality), ISO 14001 (environmental 
management standard), OHS 18000 and the SA 8000 (health and safety management 
systems) and ISO 26000 (social responsibility). CMS are a form of self-regulation which 
has been proposed as a complement to government regulation. A whole industry has 
emerged and a great scholarly interest focuses on these standardisation processes which 
have been characterised as “soft law”. In Europe, new legislation in the field of 
occupational health and safety made the implementation of OHS 18000 very likely in 
most firms. Occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMS) should help 
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companies to find preventive ways of fulfilling new legal obligations in this area. The 
interesting question of how firms in different nations implement OHSMS, and the 
resulting impact on OHS performance have become increasingly important in recent 
years. 
 
Whether such processes of self-regulation work in practice and are able to improve the 
performance of different areas remains unknown (King et al., 2005). Jensen (2002:224) 
argued that the successful implementation of a legally based participatory scheme in the 
area of working environment, as predicted in the European legislation, would be 
dependent on public legitimation based on an internalised mutual understanding of the 
general aim of the participatory scheme established.  
 
This paper has two main objectives. First, the diffusion of OHSMS by focusing on the 
legitimating aspects of it is examined. Drawing on institutional theory, we will argue that 
OHSMS may serve as a source of legitimacy for firms. This legitimacy needs to be 
maintained as a resource with the potential to yield significant economic and competitive 
benefits.  However, we suggest that when firms search for external legitimacy, 
organisational actors may act upon the legitimising process, creating unintended 
consequences for OHS performance. Organisational actors may be able to change the 
search for legitimacy from being an end in itself towards a means of improving OHS 
performance. The conditions which will be more likely to support this change in ends 
and means are discussed in this paper. 
 
Second, the extent to which the functioning of OHSMS is dependent on the different 
institutional environments for their diffusion and implementation is discussed. The 
research identifies the differences among national institutional frameworks which are  
more supportive for organisational templates under which firms are likely to meet 
legitimacy needs and at the same time improve their OHS performance.  
2 - Self-regulation of health and safety. 
 
Occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMS) are a new type of soft 
regulation. They are characterised by a systemic approach to planning and 
implementation of continuous improvement in the area of health and safety. The main 
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ideas behind OHSMS are the continuous examination and improvement of work 
processes by teams of organisational members who are trained in problem-solving 
techniques and empowered to make decisions on the basis of their learning and 
experience (Gallagher, 2000). In the last years, OHSMS have become the most important 
tools for managing working environment issues in most developed countries.   
 
OHSMS outline broad work environmental objectives for companies and require them 
to perform certain functions and employ specialised individuals.  Firms need to establish 
performance targets for themselves, as well as the means they intend to employ in order 
to meet these targets, but the OHSMS do not specify what output levels will be achieved, 
nor how they will make a difference. The process for how firms can improve their 
standards is to some extent open and undefined. Because of this highly open way of 
setting ends and means, there is an ongoing debate about the diffusion, effects and ways 
of working of certified management standards. An important issue when dealing with 
self-regulation is the capacity of different firms for self-regulation. Are they able to take 
charge of what is inscribed in the ideas of self-regulation? Do firms have the human 
capabilities to solve the problems that they face in relation to OHS? What should be the 
role of the governmental institutions and trade associations in helping firms to improve 
their capabilities for self-regulation?  
 
Critics of OHSMS suggest that the implementation of the certification will lead to a 
bureaucratisation of the health and safety issues, and that the results will be worthless or 
even depreciative for organisations (Quinlan and Mayhew,2000;  Kamp and Blandsch, 
2000). The ideas of continuous improvement contained in these systems are criticised as 
rather contradictory as they do not support creativity and experiment, which are crucial 
pre-requisites for learning (Kamp and Blandsch, 2000: 420).Without explicit sanctions, 
OHSMS will fall victim to opportunistic behaviour. OHSMS were created under 
influence of rational bureaucratic theories which are incompatibility with genuine worker 
involvement (Nielsen, 2000). Else and Beamont (2000) argue that “the use of an OHSMS 
can mask OHS problems, delude an organization into perceiving it is effectively 
managing OHS and distract effort and resources away from OHS towards the 
management system itself” (ibid:36). Self-regulation will only work when explicit 
sanctions and state supervision are included, preventing opportunistic behaviour among 
firms. Otherwise, companies can send a legitimised image to their external environment 
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while at the same time presenting different actual behaviours. This would represent a 
type of decoupling process (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, Westphal, et al., 2001), in which 
organisations are able to signal the adoption of certain practices to the external 
environment but at the same time are preserving internal structures which are not 
necessarily legitimacy-driven and coherent with the external image. Based on the 
evidence to date, Robson et al. (2007) argue that there is no clear indication that OHSMS 
represent a solution to OHS issues; the body of evidence is still insufficient to make 
recommendations either in favour of or against OHSMS (ibid:329). 
 
Supporters of self-regulation argue that the establishment of OHSMS triggers a learning 
process which results in improvements of health and safety standards. Hudson (2000) 
argues that safety has undergone a development from an unsystematic, albeit well-
meaning, collection of processes and standards, to a systematic approach specific to 
safety.  OHSMS are designed to function as a benchmarking process, i. e. as a method 
for identifying aspects of an organisation’s activity that could be more efficient and/or 
effective by comparison with performance in other relevant departments and/or  other 
organisations (Borys,2000; Gardner and Winder,1999). Organisations would be inclined 
to use OHSMS as a searching map (Weick and Roberts, 1993 ) to improve health and 
safety performance and solve internal problems ( Zwetsloot, 2000). Already during the 
attempt to become certified, different organisational groups would interact and learn in 
the process how to better deal with health and safety problems. This learning process 
would be facilitated by the current organisational paradigm which advocates more 
deliberation and influence at different hierarchical levels. Saksvik et al. (2006) argue that 
OHSMS and process evaluation may be the only kind of evaluation that will yield 
sufficient answers to OHS problems. Thus, OHSMS have the potential of being used by 
different groups interested in the improvement of their own OHS conditions.  
 
Instead of taking sides in this debate, the question addressed here concerns the effects of 
different institutional frameworks which are more likely to improve OHS performance 
or contribute to worse OHS problems.  Are the implementation and functioning of 
OHSMS likely to differ among organisations and countries? How do different 
institutional environments shape constraints and opportunities for the implementation of 
OHSMS? Do new forms of organisation of work impact the way OHSMS function? 
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The relation between country norms and the existence and nature of management 
systems diffusion across country borders and their implementation can be examined by 
studying articles from countries that differ with respect to their norms of rationality and 
progress (Guillen, 1994; Kogut, 1991; Abrahamson,1996).  Taking an institutional 
perspective, these questions are discussed in this paper, and examples found in the 
literature are compared. It is argued that the successful implementation of OHSMS is 
highly dependent on the organisational templates that dominate in specific countries, and 
that this in turn is highly dependent on the institutional environment surrounding 
organisations. The main argument is that the institutional complementarities which can 
support a successful implementation of OHSMS are different when comparing liberal 
market and coordinate market economies. As a result, the differences in the predominant 
industrial relations regimes and the prevailing organisational paradigms among different 
societies ask for distinct institutional enforcements on OHSMS.  
 
3 -  Institutions and the search for legitimacy  
 
All economic activity is embedded within a national institutional context of societal 
norms, rules and expectations which define socially acceptable economic behaviour 
(Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). Because organisations are embedded in institutional orders, 
they must transmit signs of legitimacy and normalcy in order to maintain favourable 
terms with their constituencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), they 
need to convince larger publics that they are legitimate, and they continually seek to 
enhance or protect their legitimacy (Scott, 2000) which is fundamental to extracting 
resources from their environment. Legitimacy increases the possibilities for survival. As a 
consequence, organisations tend to conform to the environmental prescription of what is 
regarded and defined as appropriate and efficient. They can, as a result, largely disregard 
the actual impact of organisational changes on organisational performance (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
 
Successful firms are legitimated models and under conditions of uncertainty other 
organisations tend to imitate them, creating bandwagon effects (Abrahamson, 1996; Staw 
and Epstein, 2000; Schaefer, 2007). For example, the introduction of ISO standards has 
been seen as a necessity for business success without any proof that these standards can 
be or are met in reality.  
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Public interest groups, local communities, and occupational and professional associations 
are constituents of the institutional environment that delineate, diffuse or impose 
prevailing norms and requirements of acceptable company conduct (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) characterise three social processes through which 
organisations tend to become similar: mimetic isomorphism, a consequence of adopting 
the successful elements of other organisations when uncertain about alternatives; 
coercive isomorphism, resulting from pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations upon which they are dependent; and normative transmission of social facts, 
generally from external sources such as professions. 
 
Institutions shape behaviour by constituting the set of acceptable interpretations and 
actions available to social actors. In the volatile new economy, actors continually deal 
with novel situations, and to craft responses, they base their choices of action on their set 
of existing understandings  which are furnished by the institutional environment in which 
they are embedded. DiMaggio (1997) argues that actors make use of schemas to 
understand and to respond to new and old situations stimulus. Schemas are "knowledge 
structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, 
relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information" (DiMaggio, 1997: 269). 
Related to schemas, actors use scripts, which are direct individual action and 
understanding in highly particularised situations. Through these schemas actors  read the 
situations and use scripts to respond to them. In the face of new situations, actors make 
use of their set of existing understandings (schemas) and translate their understandings 
into action (scripts).  
 
Because firms have little available information and need to make suppositions about the 
actions of other firms, managers may decide to emulate the behaviour of leading 
companies in the industry without fully considering the potential effects and problems 
involved in that process. Hancke and Casper (1999) argued that mimetic isomorphism 
supports the adoption of certain quality standards, as for example, ISO 9000 but its 
impact can also enhance differentiation in distinctive institutional contexts ( see also 
Walgenbach,2001;  Guler et al. 2002). The adoption of a standard model was found to be 
even more dominant in later adopters (Westphal et al., 1997).  
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Organisations adopt structures mandated by the organisations on which they are 
resource dependent. Coercive forces for the diffusion of work environment management 
systems might come from the state which expects certification as part of the regulatory 
regime. Another source of coercive pressure is the relative position of the firm in 
international supply chains. The internationalisation of firms and the integration of 
supply chains often increases institutional and customer pressures on companies to 
surpass local social responsibility requirements (Christmann and Taylor, 2001). Firms 
adopting soft law regulations may be influenced by market forces and the fear of hostile 
consumer action (Gunnigham and Rees, 1997). Certification legitimises the firm in 
relation to their costumers. In multinational corporations the requirement can be made 
by the headquarters, mainly in American owned companies that seem more responsive to 
their local legislation and more afraid of legal action from trade unions and workers.  
 
A source of normative pressure can be the high level of continuous education among 
workers, who become more conscious about their rights and the problems related to 
OHS. In periods of low unemployment, workers primarily look for jobs in firms which 
have an image of dealing well with work environment issues and working conditions. 
 
The introduction of new practices is driven by the need to conform, rather than by the 
necessity to achieve superior objective performance. In this line, new managerial tools 
function as fashions, i.e. transitory beliefs that certain management techniques are at the 
forefront of management progress. As a consequence, their adoption can have quite 
undesirable effects for companies, employees and managers. Indeed there is research 
evidence that firms adopting new “fashions” achieve greater reputations but do not 
necessarily perform better (Staw and Epstein, 2000). The main argument is that as self-
regulation is implemented in firms as a source of legitimacy, it just works when explicit 
sanctions are included, preventing opportunistic behaviour. Otherwise, companies, in an 
effort to send out a legitimised image, are likely to decouple stated practices from actual 
behaviours. Several examples can be found in the literature. Kostova and Roth (2002) 
showed that decoupling processes occurred in the context of quality management. 
Westphal and Zajac (2001) showed decoupling in the adoption of stock repurchase 
programmes. Kimerling (2001) suggests that decoupling is likely to occur in the adoption 
of ethics codes when external pressure for legitimacy is high. Gallagher et al. (2001) 
argued that the inappropriate use of audit tools (where they become an end in 
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themselves) are governed by misplaced management objectives and as a result there is a 
concern that OHSMS may end up as another ‘failed fad’. 
 
The introduction of new management systems has also been seen as a way of reaffirming 
control over workers (Knights and McCabe, 2000) or as a fashion-driven process that 
benefits only the consultants selling the new systems (Staw and Epstein, 2000). In a study 
of the chemical sector, King et. al (2005) argue that there is potential for opportunism to 
overcome the isomorphic pressures of even powerful self-regulatory institutions, and 
suggest that effective industry self-regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit 
sanctions.  
 
Because firms embrace the system for conformity reasons, its adoption may have no - or 
negative - effects on working environment issues. Certification would function as a 
fashion, which is temporary and likely to present just superficial effects. Once adopted it 
will not actually be used outside relatively trivial management matters, or it will become 
just become another bureaucratic process which does not address the practical problems 
of OH.  
 
Westphal and Zajac (2001) consider that it is surprising that relatively little research has 
been devoted to the phenomenon of organisational decoupling, given the importance of 
this to institutional theories. The phenomenon of decoupling, as proposed by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977),  is the decoupling of formal legitimised structures from actual, ongoing 
practices in the organisation to buffer internal routines from external uncertainties.  The 
next section deals with the strand of neo-institutionalism which plays special attention to 
the various national institutional frameworks and how they affect differently the same 
managerial template contributing or not towards decoupling. 
 
3.1 – National institutions and managerial models 
 
 
The historical neo-institutionalist approach treats social actors as acting within a 
framework of embedded economic relations, influenced by a particular set of national 
institutional arrangements (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). Institutional arrangements 
as reflected in national legislation, the nature of property rights, and the nature of 
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educational and vocational systems shape the boundaries and possible paths for 
legitimate action. National institutions create the ‘rules of the game’ by which individuals 
and organisations operate, cooperate and compete. They forge the way in which 
organisations come into existence and the way they develop (North, 1990). Institutions 
represent shared, collective understandings or rules of conduct reflected in laws, 
governance mechanisms and the functioning of financial markets (North,1990; Scott, 
2001), which help to define observed patterns of market exchange (Fligstein 1996). 
 
Governance systems and channels of co-decision-making are forged by a configuration 
of institutions involved in industrial relations, training systems, state interventions and 
financial intermediation (Whitley, 1999; Hollingsworth, 1997; Boyer, 2005). Thus, 
governance models present features − strengths and weaknesses − that are related to the 
institutions in which they are embedded. Institutional arrangements can both constrain 
and enable action by erecting barriers but also by creating opportunities for the 
development of employee participation and influence in decision-making. 
 
The dominant practices of firms in relation to governance models, work systems, reward 
systems and employee relations complement each other, thus forming distinctive national 
configurations (cf. Whitley 1999). The education and training of managers and 
representatives are one of the most important institutional factors informing the 
behaviour of firms. Linked to the formation and training of managers are the governance 
models that different societies have developed (Whitley, 1999). Hall and Soskice, (2001) 
characterise two main ideal types of capitalist economies: liberal market and co-ordinated 
market economies.  
 
Nordic countries are examples of co-ordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 
2001), where, among other features, participation in decision-making has been an 
important component of national industrial regimes. These business systems are typified 
by a strong trade union movement and a tradition of co-operation between labour-
market actors. In Germany, strong unions that prevent numerical flexibility strategies in 
the labour market are likely to encourage cooperation to improve quality and incremental 
innovations as they restrict price-based competition. Linked to the strength of trade 
unions is the public support for a high quality and highly regarded training system and 
strong incentives for individuals and employers continuously to improve their technical 
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skills. In Denmark an agreement establishing co-operation committees was established as 
early as 1947 by the labour movement and the private employers’ associations. Even in 
highly Tayloristic industries, which historically have been characterised by strong 
adversarial relations, Danish companies are moving towards greater co-operation and 
trust between management and labour (see Hasle and Møller, 2007: 425). Trade union 
representatives have the legal right to a seat on the board and have easy access to top 
management. By having a seat in the co-operation committees, they are able to influence 
corporate strategy and development. These institutional features are likely to reduce the 
propensity for firms to pursue strategies downplaying workers' interests.  
 
An important - if not the most important - characteristic of the Scandinavian model in 
recent years has been the ability of workers to upgrade their skills through continuous 
training, not only during periods of unemployment, but also at different stages in their 
careers. For instance, Danish workers do not necessarily expect to stay for long periods 
of time, and seldom for their whole working lives, in the same organisation. What 
employees expect from their employers is support to upgrade skills which can be applied 
in current or future jobs. Danish trade unions are strongly involved in the governance of 
vocational and further training institutions (Kristensen and Rocha, 2007), which need to 
be co-ordinated locally by networks among convenors and shop stewards in different 
firms, who in this way become important gatekeepers of the system. 
 
Liberal market economies (LME) present a strong anti-union tradition and a weak 
tendency for the participation of the workforce in decision-making. The literature points 
to several examples of American firms presenting anti-union policies and even 
attempting to transfer these to their subsidiaries abroad (Muller, 1998; Ferner et al., 
2005). The liberal model of corporate governance assumes norms of self-interest, 
opportunism and enforced compliance (Lubatkin et al., 2005: 883). Increasing 
shareholder value is an important driver of senior management decision-making in 
American companies (Froud et al., 2000; Williams, 2000). Learning and skills upgrades 
are an individual responsibility, and in general these countries are characterised by a very 
weak vocational system. The capabilities of different firms are internalised and they are 
less dependent on their environments than firms in co-ordinated market economies. 
With regard to industrial relations, trade unions are generally weak at workplace level. In 
the UK the shareholder value ideology, combined with a liberal framework of 
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employment regulation, provides for a pattern of corporate governance and restructuring 
that is primarily determined by shareholders at the expense of employees (Almont et al., 
2003: 437). Even the new European regulations concerning employee rights on 
information have not fundamentally changed the features of the British system, which 
does not encompass the co-determination or joint decision-making which are the main 
features of the German and Nordic industrial relations systems and corporate 
governance models. The relations between economic actors in LME are characterised as 
'arms length', contrary to the economic relations in CME which link the destinies of 
different social actors.  
 
If we accept the idea that different institutional environments constrain and enable social 
actors in varying ways, what are the consequences for the way firms implement different 
managerial templates? This is an important question when dealing with a certified 
management system which is diffused across boundaries: we can expect that the 
translation of this will be shaped differently according to the national context and not 
only by organisational capabilities. The role of the state institutions and certification 
bodies are of fundamental importance in avoiding or enabling processes of decoupling, 
since their intervention can monitor the way firms deal with OHS issues, or fail to do so. 
In the next section we analyse the different institutional factors which impact the 
implementation of OHSMS: the state, the enforcement agents, the dominant 
organisational templates. The next section deals with the role of enforcement and 
assessment agents. 
 
4 – The role of Enforcement agents  
 
OHSMS specify the requirements for an organisation to control its OHS risks and to 
improve its performance. However, OHSMS does not set out specific OHS performance 
criteria, nor does it give detailed specifications for the design of a management system. 
The main idea is that OHSMS may be applicable to any organisation that seeks to 
establish a management system in order to minimise risks. Organisations also have to 
implement, maintain, and continually improve their management systems which are 
evaluated annually by state-accredited certification bodies. This means that the state has 
audited their competency to assess and certify companies using the national standard and 
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methodologies. Only those certification bodies authorised by the state can conduct 
OHSMS assessments.  
 
 When these private certification bodies are able to freely determine the specific 
requirements and procedures imposed on firms seeking to become certified, different 
acceptable levels for attaining and retaining the certification are likely to emerge. 
Consequently, different certification bodies can present quite distinct standards of quality 
and exigencies. In other words, companies which do not present high levels of reliability 
on their OHSMS can move to less demanding certification bodies. The result of this will 
depend on different coalitions that might emerge among the different stake holders 
involved in this process: the state, the certification body, the firm, and the workers 
represented by their unions. 
 
Gunnigham and Rees (1997) argue that “there is no clear dichotomy between self-
regulation on the one hand and government regulation on the other. Rather, there is a 
continuum, with pure forms of self-regulation and government regulation at opposite 
ends. However, those pure forms are rarely found in the real world, in which distinctions 
between self-regulation and government regulation are incremental rather than 
dichotomous” ( ibid:366). Self regulation implies external enforcement as a last option 
(Dawson et. al, 1998). Thus, the growth in the use of management systems leads to 
questions about what the role that government should play will be and how it should be 
able to co-ordinate the public inspection of the OHSMS. 
 
Rees (1988) identifies three forms of self-regulation: voluntary, mandated full and 
mandated partial. The first one does not resemble the characteristics of the certification 
of OHSMS because it pictures rule making and enforcement as both carried out privately 
by the firm or industry itself, independent of direct government involvement. The two 
other forms are distinct in the level of the state involvement in rule making and 
enforcement. In mandated full self-regulation, rule making and enforcement are 
privatised, and the private regulatory programme is officially sanctioned by the 
government, which also monitors it and can take the necessary steps to ensure its 
effectiveness. Mandated partial self-regulation limits privatisation to either regulatory 
function, but not both. Thus, the effectiveness of OHSMS will be highly impacted by the 
roles the state plays in different societies and how other collective actors are constrained 
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to act upon the certification process and their demands linked to it. Complementary to 
that will be the capacity for self-regulation of firms as the next sections shows. 
 
5 - Capacity for Self- regulation 
 
 
In working toward compliance with OHSMS objectives and the requirements of 
certification, different institutional actors need to interact and may be able to improve 
their methods of interaction and communication. Information about each other's daily 
routines, production methods and norms can be exchanged in a prolonged learning 
process. Within this, the organisational actors involved might learn from their 
counterparts the limits for improvement of OHSMS and evaluate how they can help 
each other to overcome these.  
 
Already in the process of consultation towards certification, both management and 
consulting firms gain a much better idea of what is taking place on the shop floor, and 
firms might gain more insight on what exactly is expected from them and how they 
should act upon the various requirements. In the new regulatory approach, it seems 
fundamental to foster the already existing democratic structures and procedures in 
companies in order to strengthen business learning capacity and reflexive processes. 
 
But we should not forget that the OHSMS are quite undefined in how they should 
function and how the different parts of the systems should interrelate, perhaps with 
insufficient control mechanisms, leading to high performance companies performing 
better, while poorly performing ones fare worse.  The system is built on the idea that 
firms intend to improve their OHS conditions, and that the capabilities for that can be 
found, and that local institutions are able to provide the necessary help. But if local 
institutions are not helpful or if other more powerful actors monopolise institutional 
resources (human resources, training, etc.)  it may create a vicious circle for small and less 
powerful companies. In order to minimise the possibilities of failure, it may be necessary, 
in some countries, to increase the social visibility of firms, for example, by introducing 
``right-to-know'' provisions on behalf of trade unions. The external factors that are likely 
to influence the diffusion and successful implementation of OHSMS have been 
presented thus far in this article; in the next section the focus is placed on the links 
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between institutional support for continuous training and the organisational processes of 
joint action-voice that influence the successful implementation of OHSMS. 
 
6– Training and joint action-voice - Contrasting Cases  
 
During the last decade, several studies have confirmed the argument that more effective 
health and safety committees are  those where both employee representatives and 
management have been  trained and where representation operates through established 
trade union channels (Walters, 1996; James and Walters, 2002 ).  Reilly et al.(1995) 
showed that injury rates tend to be highest in workplaces where there is a unilateral 
determination of health and safety by management, and lowest where mechanisms of 
union-based representation are present. Consultative committees with all employees' 
representatives appointed by unions reduce workplace injuries relative to those 
establishments where management alone determines health and safety arrangements 
(Eaton and Nocerino, 2000).  
 
Dawson, et al. (1988) investigated in a comprehensive study the nature and effect of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act in Britain. They argued that an effective self-regulation 
requires people at work to be actively involved in the identification of hazards, the 
prescription and implementation of controls, and the maintenance and monitoring of 
standards and activities. Three elements are identified as crucial: knowledge, capacity, and 
motivation. They observed that the involvement of the work force representatives is 
critical. The study’s overall conclusion is that self-regulation of safety and health has clear 
limits. In their British cases, the success of self-regulation seems to be strongly dependent 
on economic conditions, the structure of industry and employment (small-firm size, 
subcontracting, or the increase in part-time and temporary employment), and changes in 
trade union organisation (declining levels of union membership). Walters and Nichols 
(2006) found an alarming low level of arrangements allowing consultation and 
representation to occur meaningfully across all their case studies in Britain. Worker 
representation and consultation were quite severely constrained in delivering their 
potential beneficial effects in some of the workplaces (ibid: 248). 
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Gustavsen and Hunnius  (1981) found that in Norway the operation of direct forms of 
involvement in health and safety was strongly influenced by the broader patterns of 
employer–worker relations within which they took place. An interesting finding which 
differs from most of the Anglo-Saxon literature points to the fact that skilled workers 
were better able than unskilled ones to convince management to invest in health and 
safety improvements. They pointed to the centrality of skilled workers to the production 
process and their experience in recognising and resolving problems as a facilitator to this 
process. They further found that workplace trade union representatives played a crucial 
role in mobilising these sources of worker influence into a ‘joint action-voice’. Frick and 
Walters (1998) found that in small enterprises in Sweden, regional safety representatives 
(RSRs) were generally well trained and very experienced. All of them had completed a 
basic health and safety training course for union health and safety representatives as well 
as several follow-on courses. RSRs generally considered they enjoyed a reasonable level 
of cooperation with employers in small enterprises. Swedish and Danish law gives 
employees the right to appoint local safety representatives in workplaces with as few as 
five employees. 
 
The process of certification involves a number of actors from different organisational 
layers, but an important factor for the involvement of those actors is the improvement of 
their skills to deal with OHS issues. A number of studies related to changes in 
production processes indicate that training is a key support for continuous improvement, 
and this is also the case for occupational health and safety (Eaton and Nocerino, 2000;  
Frick and Walters, 1998; ). It follows that resources invested in training of health and 
safety representatives and other workers are likely to produce significant benefits in terms 
of a reduction of injuries and ill-health and the economic costs associated with them. 
Injury rates tend to be highest in workplaces where there is a unilateral determination of 
health and safety by management and lowest where mechanisms of union-based 
representation are present (Reilly et al.,1995). 
 
In Denmark, due to the amplitude of the Danish vocational and educational systems 
which support continuous upgrade of skills for the labour force, both unemployed and 
employed, workers are able to attend courses related to OHS. For example, a new 
vocational programme (industrial operator) for special workers incorporates working 
environment, heath and safety issues and research projects related to these subjects into 
17 
 
the educational programme (Rocha, 2006). More recently, special workers (not only 
skilled ones) have been gaining more importance in the production process and have, 
because of the continuous upgrading of skills, enlarged their area of expertise and 
experience, becoming able to recognise and resolve a diversity of production problems. 
They can also influence management to invest in improvements in health and safety. But 
because the blue collar workers are also more central to production processes, 
management are more in need of catering to the workforce.  
 
Similar to the claims of Gustavsen and Hunnius  (1981), workplace representatives in 
Denmark play a central role in mobilising sources of worker influence into a ‘joint action-
voice’ (Kristensen and Rocha, 2007; Hasle and Møller, 2007). These characteristics may 
differentiate the Scandinavian countries from most countries in Europe: higher level of 
education of the workforce, flatter organisational structures, strong influence in 
corporate governance and blurred organisational boundaries, making workers more able, 
and management more receptive to contributing to the improvement of the production 
process. In Scandinavia OHSMS can partly be interpreted as a success (Frick et al., 
2000:005). The results are rather different where the decline of trade union recognition 
leads to a decreasing number of workplaces and workers covered by the certification as 
in the case in Britain (James and Walters, 2002). As we shall discuss in the next section, 
the dominant organisational templates among European countries differ substantially and 
this also affects the implementation of OHSMS.  
 
7  - The new organisational Paradigm 
 
Another important change that is likely to affect the success of OHSMS is  the new 
organisational paradigm which emphasises the goals of collective learning, continuous 
improvement and innovation based on co-operative relations.  March (1999) argues that 
“organizations pursue intelligence. In that pursuit, they process information, formulate 
plans and aspirations, interpret environments, generate strategies and decisions, monitor 
experiences and learn from them, and imitate others as they do the same” (p. 1). 
 
New forms of organisational deliberation are replacing the expert-dominated, top down 
model of administration with a deliberative model that brings competing interests 
together in a dialogical situation aimed at creating mutually satisfactory solutions (Helper 
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et al.,1999). The new paradigm requires workers to have autonomy over their job tasks, 
to participate in self-directed teams, to be part of problem-solving and other offline 
teams, and to regularly communicate with employees outside their work groups 
(Appelbaum et al. 2000). In short, new forms of participation uproot at a very 
fundamental level the previous governance regime. These changes involve a move away 
from traditional forms of work floor organisation and control. 
  
Lorenz and Valeyre  (2005) compared the different forms of work organisation among 
the 15 European countries. They found four different clusters of work organisation 
which are characterised as learning, lean, Taylorism and traditional. Learning organisation 
are characterised by the over-representation of the variables measuring autonomy and 
task complexity, learning and problem-solving and to a lesser degree by an over-
representation of the variable measuring individual responsibility for quality 
management. The variables reflecting monotony, repetitiveness and work rate constraints 
are under-represented. The lean model is characterised by an over-representation of team 
work and job rotation, the quality management variables and the various factors 
constraining work pace. Lean management displays strong learning dynamics and relies 
on employees’ contributions to problem-solving. However, autonomy in work is 
relatively low and tight quantitative production norms are used to control employee 
effort. The characterisation of Taylorism is in general the opposite of that found in 
learning organisations, with minimal learning dynamics, low complexity, low autonomy 
and an over-representation of the variables measuring constraints on the pace of work. 
Traditional forms of work organisation are poorly described by the work organisation 
variables which, with the exception of monotony in work, are all under-represented. This 
class presumably groups simple forms of work organisation where methods are for the 
most part informal and non-codified. (ibid:429-430) 
    
The changes in working organisation in Europe show an important new paradigm 
emerging. Kochan and Osterman (1994) stress the “mutual gains” term of the new 
organisational forms: for them, competitive advantages are linked to specific conditions 
of co-operation between organisational stakeholders which imply win- win situations, 
and support participation. In the previous organisational paradigm the whole person was 
not required, only particular aspects of the individual necessary for effective 
performance. This old emphasis on partial inclusion, which also means partial exclusion, 
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has been altered. This can benefit workers who become more integrated in the decision-
making process.   
 
Lorenz and Valeyre (2005:435) found that in 2000 on average in the EU-15 countries 
only 13.6% of employees said they were working under conditions that could be 
characterised as Taylorist, while 28.2 worked under Lean- and 39.1% under a Learning 
form of work organisation.  The research also demonstrates important differences 
among European countries concerning the predominant organisational models in 
different countries. Denmark, Holland and Sweden presented the highest percentage of 
organisations characterised as learning forms. Not less than 64% of Dutch and 60% of 
Danish employees work in learning organisations. The Nordic countries present a much 
higher percentage of learning organisation in Europe, all of them above the European 
average. The countries characterised as liberal market economies (the United Kingdom 
and Ireland) present a percentage of learning organisations below the Europe average.  
South European countries present a high percentage of employees working in Taylorist 
forms of organisations. 
 
One important new feature introduced with OHSMS is the possibility of benchmarking 
the results achieved. The control of the development in the number of injuries and 
absence for sickness is able to show how various departments or firms with similar 
technologies and processes are performing quite differently in relation to OHS issues. As 
the certification of OHSMS requires several organisational meetings of actors involved 
with the OHS issues, when problems are discussed and solutions are pursued through a 
process of negotiations, these negotiations are likely to become dynamic processes, and 
they will not end when agreements are reached, or rules and norms re-created. The 
agreements need to become the subject for future negotiations depending on the results 
achieved. As market conditions are volatile and innovation more necessary, new 
production problems always emerge and must be solved and continuous negotiations are 
necessary. All these changes affect OHS issues, which cannot be easily treated in a 
command and control type of organisation which predominated in the past. The norms 
need to be continually worked out, the greater flexibility and possibility of tailoring 
solutions to different needs of the groups involved, resulting in a wider variety of 
solutions.  
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We can expect that these easier processes of learning and improving OHS performance 
are more likely to take place in institutional environments where industrial relations are 
co-operative, learning forms of organisations are predominant, and continuous upgrading 
of skills more widespread. As a result, the functioning of OHSMS and the mechanisms 
of enforcement will necessarily present different complementarities within each 
institutional framework. Whereas organisational learning takes place at the collective 
rather than the individual company level, what individual firms learn will be transformed 
to a collective knowledge base. Thus, knowledge is acquired and exchanged between 
individual firms, the network of companies, and at different organisational levels. As 
exposed above, firms in CME are more dependent on each other; learning is likely to 
take place at both individual and collective levels. Learning at thecollective level is less 
likely to occur in environments where 'arms length' relations predominate.  
 
8 -  Discussion 
 
In spite of the fact that we recognise the strong influence of institutional mechanisms in 
shaping the diffusion of new practices, there is a need to elaborate on how these 
practices are constructed by the interplay among the different organisational groups 
under different organisational forms.  
 
We believe that OHSMS are not necessarily as insubstantial as some other managerial 
fashions. By taking charge of the implementation, organisational actors will be able to 
start ‘collective searches’ or  “collective experiments”  for new techniques which can help 
them to ‘respond to organizational performance gaps opened up by real technical and 
economic environmental changes’ (Abrahamson 1996: 255) serving as a technical 
learning process for organisations. Organisational actors may use the implementation of 
OHSMS to trigger learning of organisational processes. 
 
If the certification process spreads through isomorphic pressures, i.e. a combination of 
coercion, mimetic and normative processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), its diffusion 
might open new possibilities for variation in different institutional environments. 
Organisational actors mostly affected by the OHSMS by taking charge of the certification 
process are likely to influence how their companies will deal with heath and safety 
conditions. And even though certification can be understood as a managerial fashion, it is 
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likely to trigger the formation of new organisational coalitions among different work 
groups which in turn can enable improvements in OHS performance.  
 
The distinct national  institutions enable and constrain nationally embedded firms in 
quite different ways (Whitley, 1999, Hall and Soskice, 2000);  as a result nationally 
embedded firms are likely to  translate and implement OHSMS with different results. In 
order words, organisational changes triggered by the implementation of  OHSMS are 
path dependent. In liberal market economies, organisational actors are embedded in 
adversarial relations and thus are likely to translate and implement OHSMS differently 
from their counterparts located in coordinated market economies where cooperative 
industrial relations prevail. In liberal market economies, OHSMS have been introduced 
with a background of trade union retracement, and weak labour coalitions. In co-
ordinated market economies, in spite of recent changes in industrial relations, 
participation of employees in decision-making is still strong and more likely to influence 
the implementation of OHSMS. 
 
In a society which enables individuals to continually learn, and organisations that enable 
actors to participate, individuals are enabled to incorporate new understandings and 
develop new courses of possible action, and thus innovate in their responses to old and 
new stimuli. Otherwise, institutions would function as a cultural schemata, and have a 
quite deterministic function on actors’ behaviour, leading always to the reproduction of 
old patterns. It would be no place for learning or strategising. The repertoire for 
interpretation of different situations and consequently for how to act is continually 
enlarged by learning.  
 
The sustained popularity of certification (in terms of its uptake) and its success in several 
firms (in terms of improved performance) may be related to the fact that it includes a 
broad range of activities, many of which have become common organisational practices 
in different organisations over the last few years. For instance, an underlying premise of 
certification as a benchmarking process is that by understanding how exemplary 
performers achieve desirable outcomes, organisations can produce a better performance. 
For example, in our current research dealing with OHSMS, a manager insisted that his 
organisation would only be part of the research if other comparable companies, in size 
and production technologies, were involved, because in this way, his company could gain 
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access to new experiences and information about how other companies had effectively 
improved OHS performance. The manager knew that a company in his region (which 
was not a competitor) had been quite successful in using systematisation of information 
related to “near accidents” to reduce the number of real accidents. His specific 
requirement  was based on the assumption that understanding how other companies 
perform similar processes would make it possible for him to learn from experiments and 
contexts outside his usual frame of reference.  
 
On the one hand, the diffusion and adoption of OHSMS can be better explained by the 
search for legitimacy. On the other, improvements in OHS performance as a 
consequence of adopting OHSMS may have an impact on the organisation’s internal 
legitimacy. This in turn may trigger a continuous organisational learning process on how 
to improve OHS performance. OHSMS decentralise control of work environment issues 
to the work place level. As a result, their implementation will legitimise other modes of 
knowledge and practice in how to deal with working environment problems which are 
not defined from a top-down perspective. The OHSMS open up possibilities for 
participation of the workforce in what and how working environment issues should be 
addressed.  
 
The implementation of OHSMS in learning organisations is likely to trigger 
organisational processes of searching for new solutions, and through these processes 
organisations might change in different ways. The idea of employee participation in 
OHSMS enables organisational actors to experiment with new routines and standard 
operating procedures. The certification has the potential of activating processes of 
organisational learning, in which workers start processing information that changes the 
range of the organisation’s potential behaviours (Huber,1991). As Sabel (2005:134) 
argues, by bringing searches to bear on its choice of strategy or goals, organisations can 
use the information generated by the lower-level exploration of possibilities to inform 
and discipline higher-level decisions.  
 
Working, learning and innovating are interrelated and compatible within the new 
organisational paradigm. These processes are interlinked and are difficult to separate. 
Changes in the external environment, a more competitive market, alterations in 
technological paradigm, etc., have pushed organisations into a more volatile market, and 
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experimentation thus has become a new feature for organisations. Changes in product 
markets influence organisational templates and the strategies that companies may pursue, 
and volatile markets make firms more dependent on their employees' knowledge, a 
pattern that necessarily overcomes the previous command and control strategies. The 
new figuration emerging shows individuals who are continually gaining new knowledge, 
and organisations in a continuous search for new arrangements: these two are highly 
complementary to each other. It encapsulates a quite different way of organising, 
controlling and coordinating economic relations.  It also complements a new balance of 
power among economic actors: employees will be more able to ask and search for 
improvement in their working conditions.  
 
On the one hand, the adoption of OHSMS is positively affected by institutional 
isomorphic pressures. On the other, improvements in OHS performance are highly 
dependent on how local institutions enable and constrain organisational actors to 
influence the adoption and implementation of OHSMS. Thus, the success or failures of 
OHSMS are linked to local and national institutional factors surrounding its diffusion 
and implementation. It is interesting to observer that the Nordic countries lack what has 
been appointed, in liberal market economies, as factors undermining the effectiveness of 
worker representation in joint committees for OHS: declining union density, limited 
worker and management training and weak enforcement systems (Haynes, Boxall and 
Macky, 2005; Tucker, 1992; Storey and Tucker, 2006; Walters, 1996; Walters and 
Nichols, 2006). At the same time, the percentage of learning organisations are the highest 
in Europe among North European countries.  
 
9 - Conclusions 
 
It is not difficult to imagine that OHSMS can be placed in the realm of ethics. Firms are 
driven to become certified because they feel ethically responsible for the well being of 
their employees: this would be the use of ethic of responsibility. Firms can see the 
OHSMS as a means by which to be free from state surveillance, and at the same time 
attracting the best workers in the market and retaining their most valuable human 
resources as a way for improving productivity and competitiveness: that is an “ethic of 
ultimate ends”. Companies continually try to find a balance between these two ways of 
24 
 
reasoning and framing the working environment problems that they face. But, as this 
article has shown, how this balance is achieved is highly dependent on the institutional 
environment in which firms are embedded.  
 
It is understandable that literature still treats OHSMS as a kind of fad, which is                                               
temporary and almost worthless, but this may be an unhelpful generalisation. When 
critics claim that OHSMS are just a new fashion, they forget to ask which social 
processes are triggered by these fashions and which permanent effects may be achieved 
with unintended consequences. Organisational fashions reflect the ‘emergent collective 
preferences’ of organisational groups in the search for new techniques which can 
function as a maps for learning organisational processes – provided that they appear both 
rational and progressive (Abrahamson, 1996). Whether such fashions have intrinsic value 
and validity when they start being diffused from their originators is less important than 
the characteristics they may develop when they are interpreted by organisational groups 
which interact during the process of accreditation and beyond. If one takes into 
consideration the concept of continuous improvement that has driven the quality 
movement since the 1980s, the idea of accreditation as a benchmark process makes more 
sense, and at the same time it  runs counter to the possibility of arriving at an absolute 
standard of ‘the best legitimised practice’.  
 
OHSMS can function as the 1980s’ JIT (just-in-time) inventory movement, which 
replaced the classic approaches to inventory. It was and still is a difficult task to rethink 
and rebuild organisations for using JIT, but it is hard to find one not trying hard to 
implement it. The successful implementation of OHSMS is demanding on individuals 
and organisations: it requires sustained partnership, extensive training and support, and 
organisational receptivity to change. However, as shown in this article, the institutional 
features supporting these conditions are not to be found evenly in different countries; 
consequently, in order to improve the performance of OHS indicators in firms, the ways 
in which OHSMS and the necessary enforcements mechanisms need to be combined will 
also differ. As shown in this article, the ability of employees to affect OHSMS is 
dependent on the institutional framework in which firms are embedded. It is also 
demonstrated here that there are linkages between industrial relations systems and 
organisational forms on the one hand and the capacity for self-regulation on the other. 
This is a central part of Hall and Soskice’s notion of ‘institutional complementarities’; 
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‘nations with a particular type of co-ordination in one sphere of the economy should 
tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well’ (2001: 18). 
 
Most research dealing with OHSMS has been single country focused: future research 
should overcome this limitation in research design, replacing it with a cross-country 
comparative methodology, looking to the ways comparable firms in the same sector and 
industry implement OHSMS in different countries and their resulting effectiveness. This 
would shed light on the necessary mechanisms of enforcement which need to be 
designed in different institutional frameworks to cope with varying organisational 
templates and different national industrial relation systems. 
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